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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Search and Seizure-A
Reasonable Belief that a Third Party had Authority to
Consent to a Search is an Exception
to the Warrant Requirement.
497 U.S.

-,

Illinois v. Rodriguez,
110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990).

On July 26, 1985, Gail Fischer informed Chicago police officers that her
boyfriend, Edward Rodriguez, had beaten her.' She told the officers that the
assault had occurred
earlier that day at what she referred to several times as
"our" apartment.2 Although Fischer had previously lived with Rodriguez,
she had been staying with her mother for nearly one month.3 Fischer accompanied the officers to the apartment and let them in with her key, so they
could arrest Rodriguez.4 Once inside, the police observed drug paraphernalia and several containers of white powder in plain view.' The powder was
later proved to be cocaine.6 The police officers seized the drugs and arrested
Rodriguez, charging him with possession of a controlled substance. 7 At
trial, Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence obtained during his arrest.'
The Cook County Circuit Court excluded the evidence, holding that Fischer
had no authority to consent to the officers' entry.9 The trial court rejected
the state's claim that Rodriguez's fourth amendment rights were not viol. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2796, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 155
(1990). Fischer appeared to have been severely beaten. Id.
2. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2796-97, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 155. Fischer also told officers that she
had clothes and furniture at the apartment. Id. The record is unclear as to whether Fischer
indicated that she presently resided at the apartment, or had previously lived there. Id.
3. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2797-98, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 156-57. Gail Fischer and her two
small children lived with Rodriguez from December 1984 to July 1, 1985. Id.
4. Id at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 155. Fischer told the officers that
Rodriguez was asleep in the apartment. Id. She unlocked the door for the officers and gave
them permission to enter. Id. At trial, Fischer said she had taken the key without Rodriguez's
knowledge. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2798, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 157.
5. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 156. Officers saw the powder in both the
living room and bedroom of the apartment. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id at _, 110 S. Ct. at 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 156. Rodriguez was also charged with
intent to deliver the controlled substance. Id.
8. Id. Rodriguez contended that Fischer did not have authority to consent to the police
entry and, therefore, the search was illegal. Id.
9. Id. The Court classified Fischer as an "infrequent visitor" and not a "usual resident."
Id. This was predicated on the Court's findings that Fischer did not contribute to rent; her
name was not on the lease; she could not invite others to the apartment; she only had access to
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lated because the police reasonably believed that Fischer had authority over
Rodriguez's apartment at the time she consented to the officers' entry.'" The
appellate court affirmed this holding and the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to grant the state's petition for leave to appeal." The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a warrantless search is valid
when police rely on the consent of a third party whom they reasonably believe has common authority over an area, but in actuality does not.' 2 Held Reversed and remanded. A reasonable belief that a third party had authority
3
to consent to a search is an exception to the warrant requirement.1
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the people and their possessions by prohibiting unreasonable searches by government authorities.' 4 Although this protection extends to any place where a
person may claim a reasonable expectation of privacy,"' it especially protects
the right of the people to privacy in their homes.' 6 The fourth amendment
the apartment when Rodriguez was there; and that she had removed some of her things from
the apartment. Id.
10. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 156. The trial court concluded that
Fischer had no actual authority to consent to the search. Id.
11. Id.; see also People v. Rodriguez, 537 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. 1989) (petition for leave to
appeal denied; opinion not published).
12. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
110 S. Ct. 2793, 2796, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 155
(1990).
13. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 160.
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984) (fourth amendment protection only applies to governmental action); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1980) (fourth amendment applies to seizures of person and
property equally); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (fourth amendment applies
to both houses and effects). See generally E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA
OF THE SUPREME COURT 1-37 (1975) (discussing fourth amendment case development); W.
RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 6, at 14-15 (1972) (defining
privacy right under fourth amendment).
15. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (fourth amendment protects
"legitimate expectations of privacy"); see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981)
(applying fourth amendment protections to closed suitcase); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967) (protection includes public telephone booth); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139, 143 (1962) (fourth amendment protection applied to business offices, stores, hotel rooms,
apartments, automobiles, and taxicabs). See generally Note, The Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy - Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REv. 468, 487-98 (1976) (discussing
expectation of privacy standard); Note, From Private Places to PersonalPrivacy: A Post-Katz
Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 982-86 (1968) (discussing
factors determining justifiable reliance upon privacy).
16. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (fourth
amendment primarily protects against physical entry of home); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (full range of fourth amendment's protections apply to home); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (fourth amendment protects right of person to
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also prevents unreasonable police conduct by requiring that searches be con-7
ducted pursuant to a warrant which is issued based upon probable cause.'
To ensure that searches are reasonable, a judicially created doctrine provides
that evidence which is discovered in an unreasonable search will be excluded
at trial."8 The purpose of this exclusionary rule is to protect privacy by deterring future
illegal conduct by police officials in the performance of
19
searches.

Where reasonable official conduct can be ensured, the Supreme Court has
created exceptions to both the exclusionary rule and the warrant require-

ment. 20 Exceptions to the exclusionary rule have been created where official

retreat into own home to avoid unreasonable governmental intrusions). See generally Kitch,
Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133, 136-37
(1968) (owner's relationship to home invokes protection of fourth amendment); Note, Katz
and the Fourth Amendment A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home Is His
Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 67-72 (1974) (discussing privacy expectation in home).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in part: "... [N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.; see also New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (police must convince neutral magistrate of probable
cause to conduct search); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (purpose of
warrant to permit neutral determination of probable cause by judicial officer); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (search without warrant per se unreasonable unless
within defined exceptions). See generally Goldstein, The Search Warrant,the Magistrate, and
JudicialReview, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173-89 (1987) (discussing warrant requirement); Project,
Eighteenth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEO. L.J. 489, 495-517 (1989) (discussing types of warrants, when required, and substance of warrant).
18. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (prejudicial error committed by
use of unreasonably seized papers at trial); see also Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(rule excluding illegally obtained evidence applied to states); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (not only may illegally obtained evidence not be used
in court, no use may be made of it at all). See generally LaFave, The Fourth Amendment
Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061, 1082-86 (1987) (discussing exclusionary rule); Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure
Exclusionary Rule, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573, 575-78 (1989) (discussing history, pros and
cons of exclusionary rule).
19. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (thrust of rule is to discourage unlawful
police conduct); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (purpose of exclusionary
rule is prevention); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (excluding improperly
seized evidence protects privacy). See generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 674-78 (1970) (discussing deterrent effect of
exclusionary rule); Critique, On the Limitations of EmpiricalEvaluations of the Exclusionary
Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv.
740, 740-46 (1974) (defending effectiveness and purpose of exclusionary rule).
20. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 n.20 (1984) (emphasizing objective reasonableness standard of review adopted for cases involving good faith exception to
exclusionary rule); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973) (exception requires
voluntary consent for search to be reasonable); Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (warrantless search of
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behavior will not be affected by the exclusion of evidence.21 For instance, if
police officers rely upon a warrant in good faith, and the warrant later
proves invalid, the fruits of the search will not be excluded at trial. 22 This
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule also applies where officers reasonably rely upon a statute which later proves to be constitutionally
invalid. 23
There are also some limited exceptions to the warrant requirement, one of
which is consent. 24 Historically, consent searches were considered reason-

possibly armed suspect reasonable due to public safety interests). See generally Sikma, Collateral Search. A Survey of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, 21 S.D.L. REv. 254, 255
(1976) (discussing reasonableness and warrantless searches).
21. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352 (1987) (invalidating statute, not exclusionary
rule, affects legislators' behavior); Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (exclusionary rule's deterrent effect
not aided by punishing police for magistrate's error); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984) (deterrent function of exclusionary rule not served by suppressing
evidence because of clerical errors in warrant). See generally Goldstein, The Search Warrant,
the Magistrate, and JudicialReview, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1203-06 (1987) (discussing options which would deter judicial misconduct regarding warrants); Note, Illinois v. Krull: Extending the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule's Good Faith Exception to Warrantless
Searches Authorized by Statute, 66 N.C.L. REV. 781, 796-800 (1988) (discussing exclusionary
rule's lack of deterrent effect on legislators).
22. See Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 987-88 (exclusionary rule non-applicable where objective
police reliance on warrant reasonable); Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (exclusion only appropriate
where officers belief in probable cause is not reasonable); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79, 88 (1987) (search valid where officers interpretation of warrant is reasonable). See
generally Note, Application Problems Arising From the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 744-48 (1987) (discussing history and development of
good faith exception); Note, ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure-The Good Faith Exception in
Action-Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1100, 1103-05 (1985) (discussing development of good faith exception).
23. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987); see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (police reliance on city ordinance reasonable); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 541-42 (1975) (court cannot blame those who conform conduct to statutory or constitutional norms). See generally Note, Illinois v. Krull: Extending the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule's Good Faith Exception to Warrantless Searches Authorized by Statute, 66
N.C.L. REv. 781, 784-87 (1988) (discussing application of exclusionary rule where police rely
on statute).
24. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent is exception to
both warrant and probable cause requirements); see also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
593-94 (1946) (finding consent to officers' request for inspection of public documents); Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624, 629 (1946) (finding consent in contractual agreement for government inspections). See generally J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 4:14:6 (1982) (discussing
case development of consent searches). Warrantless searches may also be conducted when
they are incident to a lawful arrest. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)
(no doubt as to right of police to make search incident to arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (search allowed during legal arrest and evidence produced may be used in
prosecution); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (government right to search
arrestee consistently recognized by English and American law). See generally Williamson, The
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able because they were viewed as a waiver of fourth amendment rights.2"
The Court currently ensures reasonable police behavior by requiring that
consent to a search be freely granted. 26 Any consent which is granted in
submission to authority or because of deception or coercion is not valid."
In reviewing questions of voluntariness, the court must take into account all
of the circumstances surrounding the search.2 Reasonableness is further

Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 110,
124-28 (1978) (discussing cases developing exception for searches incident to arrest); Note,
Warrantless Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 119-22 (1982) (discussing relationship between
incident to arrest exception and exigent circumstances). Other exceptions to the warrant requirement are based on the existence of exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Warden v, Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (fourth amendment does not require officials to delay when life in
danger); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (warrantless search requires
exceptional circumstances); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (discussing differences between movable
and immovable areas and allowing warrantless automobile search). See generally Mascolo,
The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 419, 425-38 (1973) (discussing applicability of emergency doctrine
exception); Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and the Fourth Amendment, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 571, 581-88 (1975) (discussing emergency doctrine).
25. See Zap, 328 U.S. at 628 (privacy right waived where government granted power to
inspect books); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (waiver must be
intentional); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (no waiver found where police
coercion applied). See generally Project, District of Columbia Court of Appeals Project on
Criminal Procedure, 26 How. L.J. 902, 903-12 (1983) (discussing standards of waiver and
voluntariness used by Supreme Court in evaluating consent searches); Comment, Consent
Searck Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 297, 298-99 (1968) (discussing consent as waiver).
26. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49 (fourth amendment requires state to prove voluntariness of consent); see also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) (valid consent
found in this case because defendant was informed that his consent must be voluntarily given);
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (state must prove consent given voluntarily). See generally W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 237
(1972) (discussing requirement that state prove consent freely given); I C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 172, at 740-53 (13th ed. 1989) (discussing requirement of
voluntary or genuine consent).
27. See, e.g., Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13 (consent given in submission to authority not a
waiver of constitutional right); Amos, 255 U.S. at 317 (coerced consent ineffective); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921) (gain of consent by stealth violates constitutional
rights). See generally Leowy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1259-63 (1983) (discussing inherent perceived coercion in police request to search).
28. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (determination of voluntary consent based on all circumstances surrounding search); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (duress or coercion evaluated in light of all circumstances); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (court must look at all circumstances in
determining whether defendant's wife acted as police agent in producing items of search). See
generally J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4:7 (1982) (discussing standard of review for determining voluntariness of consent).
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ensured because consent searches are subject to "careful scrutiny '29 and are
limited to the area of consent.3 °
Consent to a search may even be granted by a third party against whom
the search is not directed. 31 The Supreme Court of the United States has
predicated the validity of third party consent searches on the actual authority of the consenting party over the subject matter of the search. 32 A majority of lower courts faced with the question have upheld searches where there
was a reasonable reliance by officials on a third party's consent to the
search.33 Not until Illinois v. Rodriguez, however, has the Supreme Court

29. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229; cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(exceptions to warrant requirement are few); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)
(warrant requirement exceptions "jealously and carefully drawn"). See generally MODEL
RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES,

Rule 701 commentary at 49 (1974) (discussing disfavor of consent searches by many courts).
30. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (search limited in scope to
"terms of its authorization"); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (retail store's
consent to entry of public did not constitute consent to wholesale search); Lewis v. United

States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (invitation to enter did not constitute consent to general
search). See generally J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 4:23-4:25 (1982) (discussing scope
of consent searches); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.1(c), at 160-64 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing boundaries of area to be searched
when search based on consent).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (consent given concerning shared premises binding on all sharing the property); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487 (valid
consent when wife gave husband's guns and clothing to police); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731,
740 (1969) (valid consent by party with joint access to duffel bag). See generally 3 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.3(a), at
236-42 (2d ed. 1987) (discussion of third party consent); 4 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 731 (13th ed. 1973) (discussing situations where third-party consent applies).
32. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 (consent valid when obtained from party with common
authority over searched area); see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1964) (hotel
clerk without authority to consent to search of guest's room); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961) (holding search gained by consent of landlord invalid). See generally
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV.47, 58-69 (1974) (discussion of effect of non-standard living arrangements on actual authority).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1986) (reasonable
reliance by FBI agents on third party consent held valid); United States v. Sells, 496 F.2d 912,
914 (7th Cir. 1974) (basing validity of search on reasonable belief); Nix v. State, 621 P.2d
1347, 1349 (Alaska 1981) (search upheld because of reasonable reliance on apparent authority); Spears v. State, 605 S.W.2d 9, 10-11 (Ark. 1980) (finding search proper where person with
apparent control of premises gave consent). But see State v. Carsey, 664 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Or.
1983) (search cannot rest on good faith of police in consent of third party). See generally
Comment, The Unsettled Law of Third Party Consent, 11 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. PROC. 115,

124-34 (1977) (discussion of California case law recognizing reasonable belief in third party
consent); Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule - Adoption by Williams and Richmond, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 83, 88-89 (1982) (discussion of New York case
allowing exigent circumstances and reasonable police belief in third party consent to validate
search).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss2/7

6

Gately: A Reasonable Belief that a Third Party Had Authority to Consent t

1990]

CASENOTES

dealt with this issue.34
In Rodriguez, the Court, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority, held
that even where a third party does not have actual authority to consent to a
search, a reasonable belief by police in the party's apparent common authority over the premises can validate a warrantless consent search.3" This holding does not require that police officials be correct in their judgment, only
that they be reasonable in their actions.36 To support its reasoning, the majority relied on previous opinions in which police judgment was not required
to be factually correct.37 The Court rejected the argument that such a holding allows for vicarious waiver of a defendant's fourth amendment privacy
rights.38 The Court reasoned that the fourth amendment does not guarantee
the right to be free from searches, only from unreasonable searches.39 The
Court emphasized that an objective standard of reasonableness must be used
in evaluating the validity of a consent search." The majority also pointed
out that its holding does not always provide justification for officers to accept
an invitation to enter a premises. 4 The Court reversed and remanded the
case back to the Illinois appellate court to determine whether the police officers' belief in Fischer's authority to consent was reasonable.4 2
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall, criticized the majority for relying
on the misconception that third party consent searches are usually reason34. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177 n.14 (reserving the issue). In Matlock, the government contended that only a reasonable belief by police officers in the consenting party's authority over
the premises searched was required to validate the search. Id. However, the Court did not
reach this issue because they found that the third party had voluntarily consented and had
legally sufficient authority to do so. Id. at 177.
35. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. _
110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 160
(1990). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun,
O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2796, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 155.
36. Id. at
110 S. Ct. at 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159.
37. Id. at . 110 S. Ct. at 2799-800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159. One of the cases the Court
relied on involved a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant which improperly described the premises to be inspected. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159 (citing
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987)). The other case the Court relied on involved a
search incident to an arrest where the wrong person was mistakenly arrested. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 2799-800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159 (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,
803-04 (1971)). The majority indicated that it was unnecessary to discuss other examples.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 159.
38. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2798, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 157.
39. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 158. The majority stated that one of the
many things which can make a search reasonable is the consent of a cotenant. Id.
40. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2801, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 161. The majority observed that the test
is whether a reasonable man would believe that the third party had authority to consent to the
search. Id.
41. Id. The majority explained that circumstances surrounding the consent could cause
an officer to doubt the validity of the consent. Id.
42. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2801-02, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 161.
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able.4 3 Justice Marshall argued that third party consent searches are not
presumptively valid because warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if
they do not fall within an exception to the warrant requirement." He reasoned that unlike other exceptions which rely upon some exigency, there is

no compelling social policy which supports an exception for third party con-

sent searches.4' The dissent argued that police officials must bear the risk
that a search may be declared unreasonable when the consenting party has
no right to agree to the search.' In placing this risk on the authorities, the
dissent attempted to balance the minimal police interest of convenience
against the weighty fourth amendment interest in preventing unauthorized
intrusions into the home. 47
Justice Marshall further stated that where a third party consent search is
not grounded on the actual authority of the consenting party, it cannot be
valid because there has been no relinquishment of a reasonable expectation
of privacy by the one against whom the search is directed. 4 He noted that
in prior cases discussing third party consent searches, the person being subjected to the search had voluntarily given a third party some control over his
property and, therefore, had relinquished some expectation of privacy. 49
Justice Marshall concluded that Rodriguez could challenge the search as a
violation of his fourth amendment rights because he had not given up any
expectation of privacy, whether or not the police reasonably believed he
had. 50
In Rodriguez, the majority properly recognizes that searches must be rea-

43. Id at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2805, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2802, 111 L. Ed.
2d at 155. Justice Marshall indicated that the cases relied on by the majority do not support
an inference of reasonableness in third party consent searches. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2805,
111 L. Ed. 2d at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that those cases involved probable cause which has a built-in possibility of factual error. Id.
44. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2803, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 163-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2804, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 164 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
dissent pointed out that the social policies furthered by searches based on an exigency are the
protection of police and the community. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2803, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 163.
46. Id at , 110 S. Ct. at 2804, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 164 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall noted that police officers have the choice of either obtaining a warrant or relying on
potentially invalid third party consent. Id.
47. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2803-04, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 164 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that the constitutional interest in deterring unlawful home intrusions outweighs
any police interest in relying on potentially erroneous third party consent. Id.
48. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2804, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 165 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2806, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 167 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall reasoned that a limitation on expected privacy which stems from joint access over
property does not justify "trampling the rights" of one who has not limited his expectation of
privacy. Id.
50. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2804, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 165 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sonable, 5" but fails to adequately address the requirement that consent to a
search be voluntarily given.5 2 In prior third party consent search cases, the
consent was given by someone with actual authority over the area
searched.53 The consent of the party being searched was held to be freely
given because he had voluntarily relinquished some control over the area to
a third party. 4 However, in Rodriguez, there was no showing that the defendant had voluntarily relinquished any control of the area to the consenting party, 5 The state, therefore, did not meet its burden of proof as to
the validity of the search because it did not show that consent to the search
was given voluntarily. 56
The Rodriguez majority also fails to address the ease with which a warrant
could have been obtained. 5" Although acquisition of a warrant is not a fac-

51. Id. at.,

110 S. Ct. at 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 158.

52. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (holding that state must
show consent was given voluntarily); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)
(prosecutor relying on consent must show it was freely granted); see also United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1980) (finding free and voluntary consent because of defendant's actions). See generally Mintz, Search of Premises by Consent, 73 DICK. L. REv. 44,
68-74 (1968) (discussing factors considered in determining voluntariness of consent).
53. See, eg., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (co-inhabitant can
consent to search "in his own right"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)
(wife had actual authority to hand over husband's possessions to officers); Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (joint user of duffel bag had actual authority to consent to search). See
generally Matthews, Third-PartyConsent Searches: Some Necessary Safeguards, 10 VAL. U.L.
REV. 29, 37-42 (1975) (proposing need for rule whereby party against whom search is directed
must expressly consent); Note, A Reconsiderationof the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
MICH. L. Rav. 154, 164-68 (1977) (discussing knowing and voluntary consent requirement in
third party consent situations).
54. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (authority to consent is based on "joint access or
control"); see also Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (joint control of duffel bag validating third party
consent search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (what one publicly exposes
not protected by fourth amendment). See generally Dutile, Some Observationson the Supreme
Court's Use of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L.
REv. 1, 14-17 (1971) (discussing value of property and agency concepts in third party consent
cases); Wefing & Miles, Consent Searchesand the Fourth Amendment: Voluntarinessand Third
PartyProblems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 261-66 (1974) (discussing limitation of consent to
area over which one has possession and control).
55. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. _ _ 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2798, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148,
157 (1990) (approving lower court's determination that Fischer had no common authority
over defendant's apartment).
56. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (government has burden of
proving voluntary consent); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (prosecutor
must prove voluntariness of consent); Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (to justify consent search prosecutor must prove voluntary consent). See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8. 1(b), at 156 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing voluntari-

ness of consent as opposed to reasonable belief by police officials).
57. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 2804, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 164 (Marshall, J.,
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tor in cases resting on recognized warrant requirement exceptions, the Court
has often evaluated the convenience of procuring a warrant in cases where
no established warrant requirement exception directly applies."8 Established
exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches involving emergencies, possible destruction of evidence, or the consent of a party with proper
authority.5 9 Because none of these circumstances existed in Rodriguez,6 the
majority gave great weight to police interests in convenience by ignoring the

dissenting) (warrant process must be observed where, as here, nothing prevented acquisition of
warrant).

58. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980) (search warrant was easily
obtainable); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (no indication that authorities could

not have easily obtained search warrant); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55
(1948) (no reason for failure to obtain warrant); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708

(1948) (whenever reasonably practical, authorities must obtain search warrant); Taylor v.
United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (police actions held unreasonable where no effort to obtain
warrant despite abundant opportunity); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
358 (1931) (information and time necessary to secure warrant existed, but no warrant obtained). See generally Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference for Search
Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REv. 231, 259-62 (1983) (discussing Court's preference of warrant and
exceptions to fourth amendment's warrant requirement); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth
Amendment, 42 U. CmI. L. REV. 47, 57-58 (1974) (discussing burden on police to show warrant was not obtainable).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (warrantless search valid
when consent obtained from third party with common authority over area searched); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (no fourth amendment violation where search
conducted based on reasonable police belief that emergency existed); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (evidence seized without warrant suppressed where no showing of imminent destruction of evidence); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (warrant requirement exceptions are "few," "specifically established" and "well delineated"). See
generally Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RiCH. L. REV.
249, 251 (1975) (discussing emergency exception); Note, Search and Seizure - The Destruction
or Removal ofEvidence Exception to the WarrantRequirement Adopted in Missouri, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 291, 292 (1976) (discussing possible destruction/removal of evidence warrant requirement exception).
_, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2803-05, 111 L. Ed. 2d
60. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.._
148, 163-65 (1990)(Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing difference between third party apparent authority consent exception and established warrant requirement exceptions based on exigencies or actual authority consent). Justice Marshall pointed out that searches based on an
exigency serve social goals of community and police safety. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2803, 111
L. Ed. 2d at 163. He stated that third party consent searches serve no "compelling social
goal." Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2804, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 164. Justice Marshall further pointed out
that a search based on good faith in a third party's consent where no actual authority exists is
completely different from the established third party consent exception because in the former
there has been no relinquishment of any expectation of privacy. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2804,
111 L. Ed. 2d at 165. But see id. at., 110 S. Ct. at 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 160 (majority
finding no difference between entry based on erroneous belief in third party consent and entry
made in hot pursuit).
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ease with which a warrant could have been obtained.6"
In expanding the warrant requirement's consent exception to include reasonable police reliance on a consenting third party's authority, the Court
improperly focused on a police view of the reasonableness of a search.6 2
Although the Court recognized that society has an interest in maintaining
law and order,6 3 it did not give proper weight to individual privacy rights in
evaluating the search's reasonableness." Furthermore, by giving greater
61. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at __, 110 S. Ct. at 2803, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 164 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (only police interest involved was convenience); cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 704 (1983) (police interest must be "substantial"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 481 (1971) (inconvenience of fourth amendment warrant requirement not to be weighed
against police efficiency). See generally Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 44-45 (1988) (discussing balancing of competing police
interests and privacy rights); Comment, The United States Supreme Court'sErosion of Fourth
Amendment Rights" The Trend Continues, 30 S.D.L. REv. 574, 586 (1985) (discussing deference court has given to public officials).
62. Compare Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
__, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d
148, 158 (1990) (defining reasonableness as not requiring police to be factually accurate) with
id. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 2805, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that

reasonable factual police errors do not make unreasonable searches valid). Justice Marshall
contended that the reasonableness of an erroneous police belief in a third party's authority to

consent to a search is irrelevant. Id. The dissent acknowledged the need for effective law
enforcement, yet argued that in balancing this police interest against fourth amendment rights,
the constitutional interest is overriding. Id. at _ 110 S. Ct. at 2803, 111 L. Ed. at 164. See
Place, 462 U.S. at 704-05 (balancing police interest against intrusion on fourth amendment
rights); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (listing exceptions to warrant requirement where societal interests outweigh reasons for warrant requirement); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (balancing need for effective law enforcement against
societal interest in fairness). See generally Greenberg, The Balanceof Interests Theory and the
FourthAmendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61
CALIF. L. REv. 1011, 1011-12, 1016 (1973) (discussing balancing of interests in situations
where no exigent circumstances exist); Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 44-50 (1988) (discussing balancing of police and individual interests).
63. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 158 (discussing
costs of living in safe society); see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980)
(criminal court's purpose is to justify societal interest in law enforcement) (quoting United
States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3d Cir. 1979)); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 565 (1980) (fourth amendment law requires observance of societal interest in law enforcement); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241 (1974) (public policy necessitates enforcement of
laws protecting public). See generally Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's
Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1047-48 (1987) (discussing balance between
society's law enforcement interest and individual rights); Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in EstablishingFourthAmendment Violations, 63
B.U.L. REv. 223, 270-72 (1983) (discussing factors relevant to societal interest in making arrests and preventing crime).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; see also United States v. Kennedy, 5 F.R.D. 310, 313
(D. Colo. 1946) (changing law enforcement demands cannot dictate fourth amendment construction); Barker v. State, 241 So. 2d 355, 358 (Miss. 1970) (provisions of fourth amendment
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deference to the judgment of the authorities conducting the search, the majority broke with the fourth amendment's historical purpose of restricting
intrusive police activities.65 In doing so, the Court overlooked the established view that the fourth amendment is intended to protect the rights of
citizens and not government authorities.6 6
The majority's focus on police reasonableness also carves out a new good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule without taking into account the historical reasoning behind good faith exceptions.67 In previous cases, the
Supreme Court allowed improper searches conducted by officers acting in
good faith to avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule because the officer's good faith was founded on judicial or legislative action. 68 The Court
are to be strictly construed in favor of citizens and against state). See generally Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367-69 (1974) (discussing
proper focus of fourth amendment protection); Comment, The United States Supreme Court's
Erosion of Fourth Amendment Rights" The Trend Continues, 30 S.D.L. REv. 574, 583-86
(1985) (discussing deference given public officials at expense of individual freedom).
65. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967) (privacy of American homes
dictates that fourth amendment requirements cannot be forgiven for law enforcement purposes); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (purpose of fourth amendment
to safeguard individual privacy against arbitrary government invasions); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (purpose of fourth amendment to shield citizens against unwarranted invasions of privacy). See generally Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
"Legitimate Expectation of Privacy", 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1289-95 (1981) (discussing law
enforcement interests yielding to private interests); DiPippa, Is the Fourth Amendment Obsolete? - Restating the Fourth Amendment in Functional Terms, 22 GONZ. L. REV.483, 503-14
(1987/88) (historical discussion of amendment's intent to restrict power of general warrants).
66. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (privacy right too
precious to entrust to police discretion); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 707 (1948)
(authors of fourth amendment deemed good sense of police officers insufficient to justify search
unless exceptional circumstances exist); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (allowing privacy intrusion without some valid basis obliterates distinction between our government and police-state). See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937) (discussing historical development of fourth amendment in response to overbroad police power granted by
general warrants); Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in EstablishingFourth Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 232-34 (1983) (discussing need for reduced police effectiveness to preserve constitutional rights).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (finding no justification for
applying exclusionary rule where police acted reasonably and pursuant to warrant); United
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (evidence should only be excluded if officer had or
should have had knowledge of unconstitutionality of search); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (exclusionary rule restricted to situations where remedial purpose of rule
is served). See generally J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 83-91 (1979) (discussing role of exclusionary rule in protecting fourth amendment rights).
68. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989 (1984) (evidence not excluded
where officer reasonably relied on warrant issued by magistrate); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
349, 359 (1986) (evidence not excluded where reasonable reliance on legislative enactment); see
also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979) (evidence admitted where police reliance

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss2/7

12

Gately: A Reasonable Belief that a Third Party Had Authority to Consent t

1990]

CASENOTES

reasoned that the actions of magistrates and legislators would not be affected
in such a case by the exclusion of evidence.69 A new exclusionary rule exception for an officer's reasonable belief in third party consent will allow
officers to rely on their concept of good faith where previously the good faith
of officers had to rest on some higher authority.7" The Court now puts the
consent of a third party on the same level as a statute or warrant because a
police officer's reasonable good faith reliance on any of these is effective to
prevent the operation of the exclusionary rule.7"

on city ordinance gave rise to probable cause). See generally Miller, The Good Faith Exception
to the Exclusionary Rule: Leon and Sheppard in Context, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 181, 199-200
(1984) (discussing maintenance of fairness when search based on good faith in warrant); Comment, Blessed are the Faithful: An Analysis of the Scope and Applicability of the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 498, 510 (1986) (discussing applicability of good faith exception where warrant involved).
69. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (exclusionary rule deterrence not
promoted by punishing officer for magistrate's error); see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 454 (use of
exclusionary rule improper when no deterrent effect); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447
(1974) (where official action pursued in good faith, deterrence rationale behind exclusionary
rule loses force). See generally Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The DangerousAttack of "Reasonable Good Faith," 36 VAND. L. REv. 1511, 1542-52 (1983) (discussion of good faith and its
effect on deterrence); Note, Illinois v. Krullh Extending the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule's Good Faith Exception to WarrantlessSearches Authorized by Statute, 66 N.C.L. REV.
781, 796-800 (1988) (discussing exclusionary rule's lack of deterrent effect on legislators).
70. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 358-60 (1987) (discussing differences between legislation and judgment of police officer); United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir.
1986) (good faith exception should not apply to invalid warrantless searches); People v.
Madison, 520 N.E.2d 374, 380 (Ill. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 257, 102 L. Ed.
2d 246 (1988) (good faith exception inapplicable because police did not rely on warrant or
statute). See generally LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its
Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895, 912-15 (1984) (proposing that even
when objective view of good faith used, search may still be based on officer's improper discretion); Note, The Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: The Burger Court's
Attempted Common-Sense Approach and Resulting "Cure-All" to Fourth Amendment Violations, 28 How. L.J. 1005, 1040-48 (1985) (criticizing situations where individual privacy is at
mercy of police discretion).
71. Compare Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
__, 110 S. Ct 2793, 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d
148, 160 (1990) (holding search valid when officers reasonably believe party consenting is resident of premises searched) with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984) (allowing
admission of evidence where search conducted pursuant to officers' reasonable belief in validity
of defective warrant) and Krull, 480 U.S. at 360 (allowing admission of evidence where search
conducted pursuant to officers' reasonable belief in validity of unconstitutional statute); cf.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (authority to make search without warrant gives officers unbridled discretion in search). See generally Ashdown, Good Faith, the
Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 335, 343-45 (1983) (discussing relative ease in determining police good faith
based on a statute compared to difficulties in determining good faith based on operative facts);
Kaplan, The Limits of the ExclusionaryRule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1044-45 (1974) (admitting evidence based on police inadvertence puts premium on police ignorance).
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By allowing police to justify searches pursuant to a reasonable belief in a
consenting party's authority, the Rodriguez majority has expanded the consent exception to the warrant requirement and created a new good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. These modifications to fourth amendment
jurisprudence give police officers greater latitude in conducting warrantless
searches. By giving police more discretion, the court has placed a premium
on police ignorance. The less police know about the authority of the consenting party, the more likely their belief will be considered reasonable, and
the more likely their search will be held valid. In addition, the Court overlooks the intent of the fourth amendment's authors to restrict the government's power to impinge upon the citizens' right of privacy. In so doing, the
Court has significantly diminished the fourth amendment's power to protect
individual privacy.
S. Jeffrey Gately
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